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Non-technical summary 
In contrast to its omnipresence in real politics the fairness issue has been largely ne-
glected in economic approaches to study political processes. This paper aims to contribute 
to a better understanding how the assessment of social fairness can be explained. For this 
purpose we analyse the determinants of fairness assessment distinguishing between fair-
ness preferences, beliefs on the sources of economic success and the functioning of de-
mocracy as well as self-interest.  
To test this framework empirically we use representative survey data for Germany 
(ALLBUS) for the years 1991, 2000 and 2004. This survey is particularly valuable for at 
least two reasons: First, it contains information about a general assessment of the coun-
try’s overall social fairness, the individual evaluation of the given distributive situation 
and objective data on the respondents’ socio-economic characteristics. Second, focusing 
on Germany allows us to analyse whether the differences in socialisation in the former 
Communist eastern and the western part of the country persistently influence the percep-
tion of social justice.  
The results indicate that fairness preferences, beliefs about individual responsibility 
for a certain outcome as well as the functioning of the German democracy and self-
interest determine the individual fairness perception jointly. Although we use proxies for 
fairness preferences, beliefs and control for personal characteristics (e.g. income, religious 
denomination) East Germans are more likely to assess the existing distribution as totally 
unjust. However, since the early nineties the east-west-differences are gradually fading 
away. Perhaps surprisingly, self-interest has only a moderate impact on a person’s fairness 
assessment, while the beliefs concerning procedural fairness indicate that the willingness 
to accept social differences is considerably higher if they are seen as a result of fair proc-
esses. Our findings are relevant e.g. to understand the demand for redistribution since per-
ceived social fairness should be among its major determinants.  
 
 
 
   
 Zusammenfassung 
In ökonomischen Ansätzen zur Erklärung politischer Prozesse werden Gerechtig-
keitsüberlegungen bislang weitgehend vernachlässigt. Die vorliegende Arbeit soll zu ei-
nem besseren Verständnis der Wahrnehmung sozialer Gerechtigkeit beitragen. Zu diesem 
Zweck analysieren wir die Determinanten individueller Urteile über das Ausmaß der sozi-
alen Gerechtigkeit. Unter den Erklärungsfaktoren unterscheiden wir unter anderem zwi-
schen Eigeninteresse, sozialen Präferenzen und Einschätzungen bezüglich der Ursachen 
für wirtschaftlichen Erfolg sowie der Funktionsfähigkeit des demokratischen Systems.  
Die empirischen Analysen basieren auf repräsentativen Umfragedaten für Deutsch-
land, die im Rahmen der Allgemeinen Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften 
(ALLBUS) in den Jahren 1991, 2000 und 2004 erhoben wurden. Die ALLBUS-Daten 
sind aus zwei Gründen besonders geeignet: Zum einen enthalten sie Informationen zur 
allgemeinen Einschätzung der sozialen Gerechtigkeit innerhalb Deutschlands, eine Viel-
zahl individueller Werturteile und Einschätzungen sowie objektive Daten zur sozioöko-
nomischen Lage der Befragten. Zum anderen erlaubt die Betrachtung deutscher Daten 
Aussagen darüber, ob die unterschiedliche Sozialisation im ehemals kommunistischen Os-
ten bzw. in Westdeutschland die Wahrnehmung von sozialer Gerechtigkeit beeinflusst.  
Die Ergebnisse unserer empirischen Analyse zeigen, dass soziale Präferenzen und 
Einschätzungen zur individuellen Eigenverantwortung und Funktionsfähigkeit des demo-
kratischen Systems die Gerechtigkeitswahrnehmung ebenso beeinflussen wie Eigeninte-
ressen. Obwohl all diese Faktoren berücksichtigt wurden, empfinden Ostdeutsche die so-
zialen Disparitäten eher als ungerecht. Diese Ost-West-Unterschiede verschwinden aller-
dings seit den frühen Neunziger Jahren allmählich. Die genannten signifikanten Effekte 
unterscheiden sich dabei in ihrer Intensität: Während das Eigeninteresse nur einen mode-
raten Einfluss hat, ist die Einschätzung zur Funktionsfähigkeit der Demokratie in Deutsch-
land für die individuelle Gerechtigkeitswahrnehmung von erheblicher Bedeutung. Dem-
nach nimmt die Bereitschaft zur Akzeptanz sozialer Ungleichheit erheblich zu, wenn sie 
als Ergebnis eines fairen Prozesses wahrgenommen wird. Dieses Ergebnis verweist auf 
die Bedeutung prozeduraler Fairness im Rahmen von Gerechtigkeitsurteilen. Unsere Er-
kenntnisse sind unter anderem für das Verständnis der Nachfrage nach Umverteilung von 
Bedeutung, da die wahrgenommene soziale Gerechtigkeit eine Hauptdeterminante für das 
Bedürfnis nach staatlichen Eingriffen in die Einkommensverteilung sein dürfte.  
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Abstract 
In this contribution we study the determinants of how individuals assess the social fair-
ness of a given income distribution. We propose an analytical framework distinguishing be-
tween potential impact factors related to the following fields: first fairness preferences, second 
beliefs on the sources of economic success and the functioning of democracy and third self-
interest. We test this framework on representative survey data for Germany for the years 
1991, 2000 and 2004. Our results indicate that self-interest, beliefs and fairness preferences 
jointly shape fairness assessments. In addition, a number of personal characteristics are found 
to be important: Compared to their western fellow citizens, people born in GDR have a more 
critical view at social fairness. A particularly strong impact is related to the belief on the func-
tioning of the democratic system. This points an important role of procedural fairness for the 
acceptance of a given distribution. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, attention for the role of fairness has increased significantly among 
economists. A major reason is the insight that fairness motives affect the behaviour of people 
in many respects (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Fong, 2001; Konow, 2003) and the analysis of 
fairness widens our understanding of individual decision making to an extent that cannot be 
achieved by models that rely on narrow self-interest maximization only. While the role of 
fairness for individual behaviour is increasingly recognized, its role in societal decision mak-
ing has so far received very little attention. This paper aims at providing a first step towards a 
better understanding of fairness in a societal context. More specifically, we want to identify 
the most relevant factors that drive the individual fairness assessments (syn. judgements): 
Why do some individuals assess a given distribution (of income) as fair while others judge the 
same distribution to be unfair? To answer this question, we propose an analytical framework 
distinguishing between self-interest, fairness preferences, beliefs on the sources of economic 
success and differences in sensitivity to inequality. We test this framework using representa-
tive survey data for Germany for the years 1991, 2000 and 2004 (ALLBUS survey). Germany 
is a particular interesting country given the Communist history of its eastern part. Hence, we 
place a special focus on the difference in fairness assessments between East and West German 
citizens. Our endogenous variable is the degree to which individuals assess the existing distri-
bution as fair. In our regressions, we find the individual’s beliefs on whether political deci-
sions in Germany are procedurally fair to be of major importance. In addition, beliefs con-
cerning the impact of individual effort on outcomes are significant. Fairness preferences have 
a considerable impact on fairness assessments while our results point at a relatively low self-
serving bias. Personal characteristics are found to be of relevance as well: In particular, we 
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 show that the east-west and the gender difference persist even if we control for different indi-
cators of preferences, beliefs and self-interest.  
Our study is related to empirical studies on the determinants of individual preferences 
with respect to redistribution or the role of the state (such as Corneo and Grüner, 2002 or 
Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007) where the latter is a particular interesting point of refer-
ence because the authors focus on the east-west-divide in Germany. Whereas these studies try 
to explain redistributive preferences we shift the attention towards the fairness assessment of a 
given (income) distribution and, hence, pose a distinctly different question. For Germany, a 
number of sociological studies address the fairness of the status quo distribution as assessed 
by German citizens (e.g., Lippl, 2003). However, they compare the differences in assessment 
by different socio-economic groups without applying a systematic conceptual framework.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the analytical framework. Section 
3 describes relevant variables covered by the ALLBUS survey and presents the hypotheses to 
be tested. The results of our empirical analysis are presented and discussed in section 4. Sec-
tion 5 concludes.  
2. Potential impact factors for fairness assessments 
Why do fairness judgements with respect to a country's social differences differ so 
widely among individuals although they assess an identical country setting? A distinction has 
to be made between four groups of explanatory factors. First, individuals may differ in their 
fairness preferences, i.e. they may apply different concepts of fairness when making their 
judgement on the actual degree fairness in their country. Second, they may entertain different 
beliefs concerning the reasons underlying the existing income inequality and poverty. Third, 
the different judgments may be driven by self-interest and the self-serving bias in the sense 
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 that a situation which is advantageous (disadvantageous) to an individual tend to be regarded 
as fair (unfair). Fourth, personal characteristics like gender, education or age may capture 
differences in the individual sensitivity to inequality or the level of experience and informa-
tion. 
2.1 Fairness preferences 
Fairness preferences may refer to very different justice theories which can be classified into 
distributive and procedural approaches. Distributive justice concepts judge fairness by the 
final outcomes and thus follow consequentialist ethics. Here, an allocation is considered fair if 
every individual holds the means he is entitled to (e.g., Nozick, 1974; Konow, 2001). The first 
variant of this type is the need principle (e.g., Deutsch, 1975). It demands that every member 
of society, irrespective of his own abilities and initial allocation, is guaranteed sufficient mate-
rial means for a tolerable living. The second variant is the equity principle and dates back to 
Aristotle (Konow, 2003). It focuses on the relationship between individual "input" and the 
resulting outcome and demands the ratio of output to input to be the same for all individuals. 
Konow (2003) makes the distinction of discretionary and exogenous inputs. Discretionary 
variables are those for which the agent is accountable while for exogenous variables he is not. 
Buchanan (1986) differentiates between birth, choice, effort and luck. He argues that people 
are likely to agree that birth is considered exogenous while effort is discretionary.  
According to the concept of procedural fairness, the question of whether a certain allo-
cation is considered fair crucially depends on the procedure through which it has been gener-
ated. Dolan et al. (2007) names a number of criteria which determine whether the decisions 
are considered fair from a procedural point of view. Following Anand (2001), they argue that 
decisions are considered fair if every person potentially affected by them is given the chance 
to voice his opinion and concern. Neutrality demands that decision-makers are able to sepa-
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 rate from self-interest. In addition, fair procedures have to be transparent and consistent. In 
this context, consistency means that the same procedure is used for a wide range of structur-
ally equivalent decisions. Procedural fairness is to some extent quasi-consequentialist that it 
protects individuals against arbitrary decisions and ensures that all relevant information is 
considered. Beyond that, it increases the acceptance especially among the disadvantaged be-
cause they feel treated politely and portly (e.g., Sondak and Tyler, 2007).  
A large number of studies have been conducted in order to elicit the dimensions which 
are empirically important in people's fairness preferences (e.g., Konow, 2003). Several au-
thors find support for the dominant role of equity for fairness judgements (e.g., Kahneman et 
al., 1986; Konow, 2001). The need principle proves relevant in a number of studies (e.g. Ko-
now, 2001, 2003). At the same time, the contributors’ behaviour is often found to be recipro-
cal (e.g. Fong, 2007). With respect to redistribution, reciprocity means that the net contribu-
tors are content to give up own means in favour of a person that exerted effort but exogenous 
variables led them to achieve poor results. However, they are not content to give up own 
means in favour of individuals that did not exert sufficient effort (e.g., Faravelli, 2007; Fong, 
2007). Finally, studies on the importance of procedural justice find that fair procedures pro-
mote the acceptance of unequal allocations (e.g., Anand, 2001; Dolan et al., 2007). 
The idea that preferences along the lines of these different dimensions should matter for 
fairness assessments is straightforward: Fairness preferences can be regarded as the yardstick 
against which people measure the actual distributive situation. People with a strong preference 
for distributive justice according to the need principle should come to a more critical assess-
ment of observable inequalities compared to somebody stressing the equity principle - pro-
vided inequality is believed to result from differences in discretionary inputs.  
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 2.2 Beliefs 
Given a certain preference function, the fairness judgement on an objective distributive 
outcome is driven by implicit assumptions or beliefs (e.g., Konow, 2003; Alesina and Ange-
legos, 2005; Faravelli, 2007). People may have full and identical information on the distribu-
tive situation in their country and they may share the same fairness preferences. Even then 
they may reach different fairness judgements if they do not agree on the role of discretionary 
and exogenous factors in explaining the observable distributive outcome. If income differen-
tials are explained by a dominant role of exogenous factors the fairness assessment of a given 
distributive situation will be more negative than if they are explained by differences in discre-
tionary factors. In a survey among sociology and economics students, Faravelli (2007) finds 
the interdisciplinary difference in fairness judgements to be driven by systematic differences 
in beliefs about the causes of income inequality but not by differences in preferences. In the 
current study, we expect that different beliefs on the role of discretionary versus exogenous 
variables add to explain heterogeneity in individual fairness assessments. People who believe 
that discretionary (exogenous) variables drive the existing distribution of income are more 
likely to judge the existing differences as fair (unfair). 
A further belief relevant in our context is related to the procedural fairness dimension. 
The belief on the extent to which a country's citizens control politics and, hence, voters have 
an impact on the distributive situation should also matter for fairness judgements. We would 
expect that a given distributive situation is assessed as fairer if an individual is confident in 
the effectiveness of democratic institutions and voter control. 
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 2.3 The role of self-interest and self-serving bias 
There is a clear case that self-interest should impact on preferences for income redistri-
bution: Net beneficiaries of purely redistributive tax-transfer schemes can be expected to fa-
vour the system’s expansion while net contributors favour a reduction (Corneo and Grüner, 
2002). The case is less clear cut with respect to fairness assessments: If people had an unbi-
ased perception of their socio-economic environment it is hard to see how self-interest should 
influence fairness assessments beyond their impact through the distributive preference chan-
nel. However, the psychological literature suggests that a “self-serving bias” distorts percep-
tion and thus assessments. The essence of the self-serving bias is “to conflate what is fair with 
what benefits oneself” (Babcock and Lowenstein, 1997, 110). Examples in the literature (Dahl 
and Ransom, 1999; Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997) are related to the fairness of compensa-
tion for extra hours worked, to voluntary givings to religious communities, in the assessment 
of lawsuits or management compensations. In all these examples, individuals’ self-interest is 
clearly mirrored in their fairness assessment in the sense that e.g. workers who work (no) ex-
tra hours regard a high (low) compensation for extra hours as fair. This bias may be indeed 
self-serving as it reduces cognitive dissonances (or simply a “bad conscience”) which result 
from a possible conflict between self-interest and individual fairness judgement (Konow, 
2000) and thus promotes happiness and mental health (Taylor and Brown, 1988). 
In the application of the self-serving bias towards the issue of social fairness assess-
ments we would expect that people who are (and expect to stay) in a relatively favourable 
economic situation tend to assess existing social differences in their country as fairer than less 
advantaged fellow citizens. 
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 2.4 Personal characteristics and the sensitivity to inequality 
In previous studies, a number of individual characteristics (e.g. gender and age) were 
found to impact fairness judgements. Their impact may result from the fact that these factors 
correlate with certain preferences, beliefs or determinants of the self-serving bias. In addition, 
the individual characteristics can cover group-specific differences in the sensitivity to inequal-
ity issues.1 
A particular German impact factor is related to the Communist past of the eastern part 
of the country which has left its marks in the minds of people. Ockenfels and Weimann 
(1999) detect significant behavioural differences of Western and Eastern Germans in public 
good and solidarity experiments. Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) show that compared to 
their Western German countrymen, Eastern Germans have a stronger preference for redistri-
bution that cannot fully be explained by self-interest and the simple fact that Eastern Germans 
are relatively poor. It must be stressed that these known effects are accounted for by the inclu-
sion of fairness preferences into our study design. Beyond that, however, it may well be the 
case that the experience under a Communist regime can have an independent impact on social 
assessments, e.g. by making people highly sensitive to take note of social differences. There-
fore we expect Germans who have living experience in the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) to assess the social situation as relatively unfair. This effect is expected to be stronger, 
the larger the part of the life-span a person lived under socialism.  
The literature reports that women have a stronger preference for income redistribution – 
be it through government policy or charity (e.g., Piper and Schnepf, 2008; Corneo and Grue-
ner, 2002; Delaney and O’Toole, 2008). This difference may result from a gender gap in in-
come, education or job-opportunities and the stronger role of household labor that promotes a 
self-serving bias in favour of more equality.  In addition, a gender gap is reported for beliefs 
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 (e.g., Schlesinger and Heldman, 2001; Fong, 2001), risk-aversion (e.g., Meier-Pesti and Penz, 
2008) and in the sensitivity to inequality (e.g., Schlesinger and Heldman, 2001). In our cur-
rent study, we can account for some of these differences but not for all of them. Thus, we ex-
pect the gender gap in fairness assessments to persist. As the workforce participation among 
women in the former GDR was higher and the wage-gap was lower, the gender effect may be 
weaker for East German women. On the other hand, the fact that the post-transitional loss in 
employment, income and social status was especially high for East German women points in 
the opposite direction.  
Religiosity is another important personal characteristic. Religious people are more likely 
to believe that it is one’s duty to be industrious in the here and now (e.g., Benabou and Tirole, 
2006; Tan, 2006). Combined with the conviction that effort pays, this may lead them to accept 
social inequality as just. On the other hand, they are likely to exhibit a stronger sensitivity to 
inequaility and/or place stronger emphasis on the need principle (e.g., Tan, 2006). The net 
effect of religion on the assessment of existing inequalities is thus undetermined.  
There are at least two arguments for an independent impact of age on social fairness as-
sessments. First, life experience differs across age classes. Older people may remember the 
substantial social inequalities before the expansion of the welfare state since the 1970s (Lind-
beck, 1995; Heinemann, 2008). These memories may make them see today’s situation less 
critical. Second, uncertainty about the own economic and social status in life is larger for the 
young than for the old. Compared to the old, the perspective of young people with respect to 
their country’s social situation is rather characterized by a thicker “veil of ignorance” (e.g., 
Rawls, 1971). As a consequence, the old may pay less attention to social inequality because it 
does not serve as indicator for social risks in their own life as it does for the young. This sec-
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 ond aspect is clearly related to self-interest. Both arguments lead us to postulate a positive 
impact of age on social fairness judgements. 
Education impacts on fairness assessments through different channels (e.g., Lewin-
Epstein et al., 2003). First, education clearly is a useful proxy for a person’s permanent in-
come and thus relates to self-interest: Like current income, a better education would then lead 
to a more favourable assessment of existing inequalities. However, better education also coin-
cides with more abstract thinking about fairness and may lead to superior knowledge about 
the existing level of inequality. No clear prediction is made with respect to the sign of the 
latter aspects and therefore the overall effect of education is ambiguous. 
Even though our study asks for the determinants of social fairness assessments for the 
distributional situation of the country as whole, the individual assessment should be influ-
enced by his or her local environment. It is well known from the psychological literature that 
people’s judgement of their country’s situation is strongly influenced by highly salient infor-
mation e.g. with respect to neighbours’ or friends’ situation and less by objective socio-
economic data for the country in aggregate (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). Whereas the fate of per-
sonally known individuals evokes emotions like empathy, objective economic data does not 
have a similar emotional impact (Singer and Fehr, 2005). Apart from this, local economic 
conditions potentially have a double impact on an individual’s objective situation. First, local 
unemployment indicates local exposition to an economic risk (e.g., Moene and Wallerstein, 
2003). Second, it points to possible local externalities from social problems which may affect 
the well-being of wealthy citizens as a consequence, e.g., from the positive impact of unem-
ployment on the prevalence of crime (e.g., Piven and Cloward, 1971). Hence, local macro-
economic data like the regional unemployment rate can add to a more comprehensive view at 
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 the individual’s fairness assessment. With respect to the local unemployment rate our reason-
ing leads us to postulate a negative impact on social fairness judgements.  
3. The Database 
The General German Social Survey ("ALLBUS") offers a promising starting point to 
test the relevance of the above mentioned determinants for social fairness assessments.2 This 
survey has been conducted biannually between 1980 and 2006 and is representative for the 
German population. Since we are particularly interested in the impact of socialization under 
Communism in the eastern part of the country we base our study on data collected after 1989. 
The variables central to our study are not included in every survey. Therefore we restrict our 
analysis to the years 1991, 2000 and 2004. As the dependent variable we focus on the follow-
ing survey question:3 “All in all, I think the social differences in this country are just”.4 This 
question comes very close to a general assessment of a country's overall social fairness allow-
ing both for the inclusion of objective data and the individual evaluation of the given distribu-
tive situation. The participants’ provide their view on a scale from 1 (“I fully agree”) to 4 (“I 
disagree entirely”). Hence, a larger (lower) value is associated with a less (more) favourable 
assessment. With respect to the determinants of fairness assessments, ALLBUS contains in-
formation on the demographic, social and economic situation of individuals and households. 
Additionally, it contains questions concerning their attitudes on a number of important politi-
cal and social issues. The corresponding data offers us proxies to cover potential determinants 
from all the potentially relevant fields as developed in the preceding section.  
Fairness preferences 
ALLBUS reports on three questions that provide insights into the respondents’ prefer-
ences for distributional and procedural fairness. As an indicator for the respondents’ distribu-
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 tive fairness preferences we use their agreement to the statement that people should have a 
“decent income even without achievement”. As a robustness check we also make use of an 
alternative measure which captures the attitude towards socialism, since the underlying idea is 
strongly connected with equality. Specifically, we expect those participants’ supporting the 
following sentence: ”Socialism is basically a good idea, it was just put into practice badly” to 
be in favour of an egalitarian distribution. Both statements capture the relative importance of 
the need principle versus the equity principle in individual fairness preferences.5  For both 
measures, we construct dummy variables, which equal one if a respondent prefers a distribu-
tion according to the need-principle, and zero otherwise (for definitions see the appendix). 
Along the lines of our argumentation above (section 2.1) we expect a positive sign for both 
variables; Other things equal, those who prefer the need principle assess a given distribution 
as less fair.  
Procedural fairness preferences are measured by a question on political priorities. Peo-
ple that ranked “more influence for citizens” to be the most or second most important politi-
cal goal are defined to have a high preference for procedural fairness. We do not expect that 
the importance assigned to procedural fairness will have a direct impact on social fairness 
assessments. However, in combination with the belief on the political influence of citizens it 
should matter. We will come back to this issue below. 
Beliefs 
To develop an indicator for the participants’ beliefs with respect to the relative influence 
of discretionary variables on individual allocation, we evaluate their answers to the questions 
whether individual “achievement, industriousness” or “right social background” are impor-
tant prerequisites for “social success and upward mobility”. As hypothesized (section 2.2) we 
expect that respondents assigning more explanatory power for individual success to the first 
11 
 (second) factor should assess social differences as relatively fair (unfair). We construct 
dummy variables (one for the answer “(very) important” and zero otherwise) and expect a 
negative (positive) sign for the "achievement, industriousness" ("right social background") 
dummy.  
The satisfaction with “democracy as practiced in Germany“ is used to capture the de-
gree to which political decisions in Germany are viewed as procedurally fair. Since many cru-
cial factors that affect the distribution of income (e.g. tax rates, unemployment benefits, pen-
sions) are determined politically, this variable covers the essential procedures relevant for our 
analysis. According to theory (section 2.2) we predict that satisfaction with democracy-
dummy should be favourable to a more positive view on social fairness. Furthermore, we 
would expect this impact to be particularly strong for those who have a strong preference for 
citizens' influence. This reasoning leads us to include an interaction between the belief vari-
able on satisfaction with democracy and the preference for more influence of citizens. 
Self-interest 
According to our theoretical consideration (section 2.3) we suppose that the judgement 
of the social differences is biased by the individuals’ self-interests. To test for the relevance of 
a self-serving bias we make use of income as our primary indicator. The ALLBUS survey 
provides information on the net income and the size as well as the composition of households 
which enables us to calculate the household equivalent income based on the OECD-modified 
scale.6 The self-serving bias theory suggests a positive relationship between the respondent’s 
income and his readiness to accept inequality as fair. In addition to income we take the em-
ployment status as a further straightforward proxy for the self-interest in redistribution. We 
expect unemployed respondents to have a more critical view at social fairness in their country.  
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 Personal characteristics and individual differences in sensitivity 
Given our special focus on the impact of communism on fairness assessments, we in-
troduce a dummy variable equal to one for the place of birth in Eastern Germany. This vari-
able represents the effects of a socialisation under Communism. As argued above we predict a 
positive sign. For reasons of robustness, we also use the share of years spent under socialist 
rule as an alternative measure (measured by the ratio age at 1990 by age at the year of obser-
vation for all individuals born after 1948; for the others, only the years 1949-1990 are in-
cluded in the enumerator). It is highly correlated with the east-dummy and shows the same 
performance. Hereafter, we only report on the latter. In order to test for convergence in fair-
ness assessments between the eastern and western part since re-unification, we interact the 
east-dummy with time. A dummy for female respondents captures the impact of gender on the 
assessment of social differences. A positive sign is anticipated even when differences in pref-
erences, beliefs and education or income are controlled for. To account for the special role of 
East German women, we introduce the interaction between the two dummies. No prediction is 
made with respect to the sign.  
We also control for the respondent’s age expecting a positive sign. A dummy variable is 
included to capture the participant’s membership in an institutionalized religious community 
(equalling one if respondent is a member and zero otherwise). The impact of being religious 
on the assessment of the existing social differences is ambiguous. To control for the level of 
education, we use a dummy variable, which equals one if the participant has a qualification 
for university entrance (high-school degree, A-levels), and zero otherwise. No clear prediction 
is made with respect to the corresponding sign. The rate of unemployment in the participants’ 
resident states is included to proxy the effect of local economic conditions. A negative sign is 
predicted. 
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 Table 1 about here 
Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics of our variables. Except for the correlation be-
tween EAST and UNEMPLOYED (-0.66) and EAST and RELIGION (-0.56), the correlation 
between the exogenous variables is low. More importantly, variables of self-interest on the 
one hand and preferences respectively beliefs on the other hand are not found to be highly 
correlated. The coefficients of correlation are well below an absolute value of 0.3. Thus, the 
distinction between these categories should be upheld.  
4. Econometric Results 
We use an ordered probit approach to analyse the determinants of the individual fairness 
assessment. The results are summarized in Table 2. Column 1 reports the results of our basic 
specification including explanatory variables from all categories introduced in section 3. 
Specification 2 uses the opinion about socialism as a proxy for distributional fairness prefer-
ences instead of the variable NEED. In order to focus on the impact of procedural fairness we 
add the preferences for fair political processes and interact them with the beliefs concerning 
the democratic practice. The latter are a bottleneck concerning the number of years included 
in our estimation. Omitting this variable allows us to include observations from 2004 (column 
4). Finally, we introduce two models that are related to the different socialisation in the for-
mer GDR and Western Germany. To account for the special role of women in East Germany 
we introduce the interaction of both variables in specification 5. Specification 6 interacts the 
year-dummy for 2000 and the east-dummy to calculate the speed of convergence in the fair-
ness assessments as suggested by Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007).7 
Table 2 about here 
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 Our first robust result is the highly significant and positive impact of preferences con-
cerning distributional fairness on the sensitivity to social differences. While the preferences 
for procedural fairness prove insignificant, the corresponding beliefs (i.e. satisfaction with 
democracy) have the predicted sign and are highly significant in all models. This indicates 
that individuals are more willing to accept an unequal outcomes if these result from a fair 
(democratic) process. The interaction between procedural preferences and the corresponding 
beliefs are insignificant.  The coefficients of our variables capturing the respondent’s beliefs 
about the driving forces of individual success show the expected signs, though only the indus-
triousness variable is persistently significant. respondents who are convinced that a person’s 
own industriousness determines his success in life assess the given social differences as less 
unfair. Believing that the social background determines the individual fortunes is only signifi-
cant if the beliefs concerning the procedural fairness are not controlled for (see column 4).  
As anticipated, the self-serving bias captured by the household equivalent income influ-
ences the fairness assessment. Those with a higher equivalent income are more likely to ac-
cept social differences. The impact of the employment status is only weakly significant and 
positive while the local rate of unemployment in the respondent’s resident state shows a 
strong positive impact. This indicates that unemployed respondents and respondents living in 
regions with high unemployment risk are less content with the given distribution.  
Among the individual characteristics the respondent’s age, gender, religion and origin 
clearly influence the fairness assessment. Being old and religious is connected with a higher 
acceptance of social differences. Contrary to that, women and persons born in the former 
GDR are found to be less content with the given distribution. Beyond that there is no addi-
tional effect of women who were born in the eastern part. The interaction between the 2000-
15 
 dummy and the EAST-dummy indicates that the differences between East and West Germans 
were larger in 1991 than in 2000.  
In sum, we show that all introduced categories of driving factors jointly affect the as-
sessment concerning social fairness. Comparing the marginal effects reported in table 2, we 
find an outstanding impact of the beliefs concerning procedural fairness specified as satisfac-
tion with the democratic system. The probability to assess the social differences in Germany 
as entirely unjust declines by more than 16 percentage points if the respondent is content with 
the democratic practice. The preferences for distributional fairness are also a strong determi-
nant. Our results indicate that the probability of assessing the given distribution as entirely 
unjust rises by 7.12 percentage points if one is in favour of the need-principle (8.41 if we use 
the variable SOCIALISM). In addition, the belief concerning the impact of industriousness on 
outcomes is important. The probability of assessing the social differences as entirely unjust 
decreases by approximately 7 percentage points if one believes that industriousness has a 
strong impact on outcomes. The assessment of the overall societal fairness is also signifi-
cantly driven by self-interests and the resulting self-serving bias, however, only to a modest 
extent. Especially the contribution of income is small: The probability to assess the social 
differences as entirely unjust declines by only 2.61 percentage points if a respondent earns 
653.45 Euro (one standard deviation, see table 1) more, while it is 6 percentage points higher 
if the respondent is currently unemployed. The impact of the unemployment rate in the re-
spondent’s neighbourhood is negligible. Among the individual characteristics of the respon-
dent we find a strong impact of religion: Religion is connected with an 8.68 percentage point 
lower probability of being entirely discontent with the social differences. The gender-gap per-
sists and being female increases the probability of assessing the distribution as entirely unjust 
by 5 percentage points. Since we control for beliefs, preferences and self-interest as well as 
several socio-economic factors, this result indicates that women tend to have a higher sensi-
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 tivity for inequality. Recognising the specific situation in Germany, the differences in fairness 
assessments between those respondents socialised in the former GDR and FRG are of special 
interest. The east-dummy provides strong support to our hypothesis that East Germans are 
highly sensitive to perceive inequality. The probability of assessing the differences as totally 
unjust is about 12 percentage points higher for those born under the communist regime. Nev-
ertheless we find a strong evidence for a convergence during the years after reunification: The 
marginal effect of the interaction between the dummy for 2000 and the east-dummy indicates 
that the differences in fairness assessments were 7.19 percentage points lower in 2000 than in 
1991. In other words, over 50 percent of the differences in the fairness judgments in East and 
West Germany have disappeared between 1991 and 2000, since the marginal effect of the 
east-dummy – indicating the differences in fairness assessments between both parts in 1991 - 
is about 0.14. Hence, we would expect the discrepancies to disappear in approximately 20 
years after the reunification if the convergence is linear.  
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyse the fairness assessments using the example of Germany: 
Which factors make some citizens assess the existing distribution in Germany (including the 
social differences) as fair while making others judge them as unfair? Based on the literature, 
we propose an analytical framework that differentiates between fairness preferences, beliefs 
concerning the underlying causes of social differences respectively income inequality and a 
self-serving bias. In an empirical analysis using results from the ALLBUS survey for 1991, 
2000 and 2004, we identify all three groups of factors to be important for the overall fairness 
assessment. Personal characteristics like age and gender are also found to drive assessments.  
In line with e.g. Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007), we find a distinct difference in 
fairness judgments between East and West German citizens even 10 years after unification. 
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 This difference persists when the preferences, beliefs and economic variables are accounted 
for. Since 1991, this effect is gradually fading. The convergence in fairness assessments de-
rived from our analysis is somewhat faster than the convergence in redistributive preferences 
found by Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007). Even though there are distinct east-west dif-
ferences in the situation of women both before 1990 and in the transitional period thereafter, 
we do not find a difference in fairness assessments between East and West German women. 
This does not necessarily mean that the effect of gender is independent of the economic and 
social environment (e.g., Meier-Pesti and Penz, 2008). More likely, the effect of communist 
socialization on women and the negative impact of transition on the social status of East Ger-
man women neutralize each other. 
Despite the existence of a self-serving bias, we do not find this bias to blur the eco-
nomic distinction between preferences, beliefs and self-interest (respectively self-serving 
bias). This means that people can share common preferences and beliefs even if they do not 
share the same self-interest. The strong impact of the beliefs concerning procedural fairness is 
surprising for economists who are used to judge allocations by their outcomes and often ne-
glect procedures. If we accept the premise that it is preferable to live in a society where a 
large share of people assesses the status quo distribution as fair, the current paper adds yet 
another piece of evidence that points at the importance of procedural fairness for social wel-
fare (e.g., Frey and Stutzer, 2002). 
When it comes to policy preferences, the above result indicates that a more favourable 
assessment of procedural fairness leads citizens to judge the status quo as more fair and thus 
reduces the pressure on politicians to pursue redistributive policies. Other things equal, a less 
intense redistribution is expected for democracies that are based on institutions promoting 
procedural fairness – e.g. through elements of direct democracy or a federalist structure with 
18 
 far-reaching participation on the local level. On the other hand, a more favourable judgement 
on procedural fairness should have a positive impact on trust which in turn may reduce the 
resistance against market oriented reforms. In any case, the impact of the citizens’ assessment 
of (procedural) fairness on both redistribution and market oriented reforms promises to be a 
fruitful field of future research.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
Dependent Variable 
FAIRNESS 
ASSESSMENT 
21587 2.8321 0.8944 1 4 
Preferences 
NEED 15661 0.4558 0.4981 0 1 
SOCIALISM 17009 0.5614 0.4962 0 1 
INFLUENCE FOR         
CITIZENS 
46953 0.5584 0.4966 0 1 
Beliefs 
INDUSTRIOUS 11125 0.9553 0.2066 0 1 
BACKGROUND 10906 0.5963 0.4907 0 1 
 
DEMOCRACY 19088 0.7058 0.4557 0 1 
POCEDURAL FAIRNESS 18744 0.3801 0.4854 0 1 
Self-interest/self-serving bias 
UNEMPLOYED 47904 0.0509 0.2198 0 1 
EQUIVALENT INCOME 22972 1073.415 653.4533 20 26666.67 
Further variables 
FEMALE 47947 0.5238 0.4994 0 1 
EDUCATION 47210 0.2096 0.4070 0 1 
AGE 47878 46.5997 17.2790 18 97 
EAST 16741 0.4046 0.4908 0 1 
EAST_ FEMALE 16741 0.2100 0.4073 0 1 
EAST_2000 16741 0.0775 0.2675 0 1 
RELIGION 47754 0.7664 0.4231 0 1 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 9808x 11.2355 5.0304 3.7 22.1 
x The summary statistic for the unemployment rate includes only observations from the relevant years. 
 
Table 2: Determinants of the individual fairness assessments (ordered probit estimations) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Coefficient Marginal effectx Coefficient 
Marginal 
effect Coefficient 
Marginal 
effect Coefficient 
Marginal 
effect Coefficient 
Marginal 
effect Coefficient 
Marginal 
effect 
Preferences 
NEED 0.2460 (5.38)*** 0.0773   
0.2393 
(5.19)*** 0.0747 
0.2051 
(5.75)*** 0.0660 
0.2457 
(5.37)*** 0.0772 
0.2488 
(5.44)*** 0.0781 
SOCIALISM   0.2726 (5.52)*** 0.0841         
INFLUENCE FOR 
CITIZENS     
0.1322 
(1.36) 0.0406       
Beliefs 
INDUSTRIOUS -0.2039 (-1.85)* -0.0677 
-0.2333 
(-2.08)** -0.0785 
-0.1856 
(-1.67)* -0.0610 
-0.3041 
(-3.68)*** -0.1053 
-0.2063 
(-1.88)* 
-0.0685 
 
-0.2190 
(-1.99)** -0.0730 
BACKGROUND 0.0570 (1.23) 0.0178 
0.0631 
(1.34) 0.0198 
0.0676 
(1.45) 0.0210 
0.0893 
(2.48)** 0.0284 
0.0556 
(1.20) 0.0174 
0.0583 
(1.26) 0.0182 
DEMOCRACY -0.5086 (-9.74)*** -0.1690 
-0.4965 
(-9.30)*** -0.1659 
-0.6075 
(-6.53)*** -0.2027   
-0.5086 
(-9.74)*** -0.1690 
-0.5043 
(-9.65)*** -0.1674 
PROCEDURAL 
FAIRNESS     
0.1680 
(1.52) 0.0528       
Self-interest/self-serving bias 
UNEMPLOYED 0.1783 (1.80)* 0.0587 
0.1751 
(1.75)* 0.0580 
0.1727 
(1.73)* 0.0565 
0.2113 
(2.86)*** 0.0715 
0.1826 
(1.84)* 0.0602 
0.1730 
(1.75)* 0.0569 
EQUIVALENT 
INCOME# 
-0.0001 
(-3.78)*** 
-0.00004 
[-0.0261] 
-0.0001 
(-4.25)*** 
-0.00004 
[-0.0261] 
-0.0001 
(-3.90)*** 
-0.00004 
[-0.0261] 
-0.0002 
(-6.83)*** 
-0.00005 
[-0.0327] 
-0.0001 
(-3.72)*** 
-0.00004 
[-0.0261] 
-0.0001 
(-3.38)** 
-0.00003 
[-0.0196] 
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Table 2 continued 
Further variables 
FEMALE 0.1452 (3.22)*** 0.0454 
0.1650 
(3.60)*** 0.0520 
0.1481 
(3.25)*** 0.0460 
0.1821 
(5.24)*** 0.0582 
0.1806 
(2.88)*** 0.0565 
0.1494 
(3.31)*** 0.0467 
EDUCATION 0.0141 (0.25) 0.0044 
0.0009 
(0.02) 0.0003 
-0.0252 
(-0.44) -0.0078 
-0.0758 
(-1.73)* -0.0239 
0.0150 
(0.26) 0.0047 
0.0105 
(0.18) 0.0033 
AGE# -0.0049 (-3.39)*** 
-0.0015 
[-0.0259] 
-0.0051 
(-3.46)*** 
-0.0016 
[-0.0277] 
-0.0040 
(-2.72)*** 
-0.0012 
[-0.0207] 
-0.0045 
(-4.12)*** 
-0.0014 
[-0.0242] 
-0.0049 
(-3.41)*** 
-0.0015 
[-0.0259] 
-0.0049 
(-3.41)*** 
-0.0015 
[-0.0259] 
EAST 0.4049 (5.72)*** 0.1261 
0.3725 
(5.18)*** 0.1168 
0.3986 
(5.56)*** 0.1234 
0.3315 
(5.71)*** 0.1065 
0.4436 
(5.19)*** 
0.1380 
 
0.4500 
(6.11)*** 0.1398 
EAST_FEMALE         -0.0727 (-0.81) -0.0225   
EAST_2000           -0.2437 -(2.24)** -0.0719 
RELIGION -0.2906 (-5.07)*** -0.0927 
-0.2474 
(-4.26)*** -0.0792 
-0.2675 
(-4.60)*** -0.0846 
-0.3017 
(-6.85)*** -0.0985 
-0.2885 
(-5.03)*** -0.0920 
-0.2787 
(-4.84)*** -0.0887 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
RATE# 
0.0223 
(2.69)*** 
0.0070 
[0.0352] 
0.0183 
(2.17)** 
0.0058 
[0.0292] 
0.0244 
(2.90)*** 
0.0076 
[0.0382] 
0.0197 
(3.29)*** 
0.0063 
[0.0317] 
0.0223 
(2.68)*** 
0.0070 
[0.0352] 
0.0343 
(3.47)*** 
0.0107 
[0.0538] 
Year-dummies 
2000 -0.2162 (-3.46)*** -0.0669 
-0.2026 
(-3.18)*** -0.0632 
-0.2341 
(-3.71)*** -0.0719 
-0.2085 
(-3.76)*** -0.0644 
-0.2158 
(-3.45)*** -0.0667 
-0.1641 
(2.24)** -0.0509 
2004       0.7800 (1.41) 0.0258     
Regression diagnostic 
p-value joint signifi-
kance of variables 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Observations 2438  2350  2399  4072  2438  2438  
Pseudo-R² 0.0978  0.0985  0.1031  0.0706  0.0979  0.0986  
p-value likelihood-
ratio test for joint 
significance of the 
year-dummies 
0.0005  0.0015  0.0002  0.0000  0.0006  0.3262  
x The marginal effects are reported for the most negative answer category. # The effect of an increase by one standard deviation is presented in the square brackets. 
*/**/*** significant at 10/5/1 percent level.  
Data – APPENDIX 
Table 3: Variable Explanations 
Variable Unit Explanation Categories Corresponding 
ALLBUS question 
Dependent variable 
FAIRNESS 
ASSESSMENT 
Discrete 
variable 
Respondent’s answer to the statement “social 
differences in Germany are just”. 
1: “completely agree” 
to 4: “completely 
disagree”  
v155 
Preferences 
NEED Dummy “Decent income even without achievement.” 1, if the respondent 
approves; 0 other-
wise. 
v152 
SOCIALISM Dummy “Socialism: Good idea, poorly implemented.” 1, if the respondent 
approves; 0 other-
wise. 
v109 
INFLUENCE FOR 
CITIZENS 
Dummy “Political goals: More influence for citizens.” 1, if the respondent 
ranks it as most/ 
second most impor-
tant goal; 0 other-
wise. 
v97 
Beliefs 
INDUSTRIOUS Dummy “Prerequisites for social success and upward 
mobility: Achievement, industriousness.” 
1, if the respondent 
approves; 0 other-
wise. 
v142 
BACKGROUND Dummy “Prerequisites for social success and upward 
mobility: Right social background .” 
1, if the respondent 
approves; 0 other-
wise. 
v145 
DEMOCRACY Dummy Satisfaction with democracy in the FRG 1, if the respondent 
approves; 0 other-
wise. 
v17 
PROCEDURAL 
FAIRNESS 
Dummy Interaction term between beliefs in and prefer-
ences for procedural fairness. 
1, if the respondent 
prefers and beliefs in 
procedural fairness; 0 
otherwise. 
v17, v97 
Self-interest/self-serving bias 
UNEMPLOYED Dummy Employment status of the respondent. 1, if the respondent is 
currently unem-
ployed; 0 otherwise. 
v461, v462 
EQUIVALENT 
INCOME 
Continuous 
variable 
Monthly net income (in Euro) of the respon-
dent’s household adjusted by the number of 
household member. (Calculation based on the 
“OECD-modified scale”: 
3.0)995983(5.0)1983(1
582
⋅−+⋅−+ vvv
v ) 
 v582, v983, v995  
 
 
27 
 Table 3 continued 
Further variables 
FEMALE Dummy Sex of respondent. 1, if the respondent is 
female; 0 otherwise. 
v434 
EDUCATION Dummy Respondent’s general school leaving certifi-
cate. 
1, if the respondent 
has a secondary 
qualification for 
university entrance; 0 
otherwise. 
v441 
AGE Discrete 
variable 
Age of respondent. 18 – 97 years. v432 
EAST Dummy Origin of respondent. 1, if the respondent is 
born in East Ger-
many; 0 otherwise. 
v874 
EAST_FEMALE Dummy Interaction term between FEMALE and 
EAST. 
1, if the respondent is 
born in East Germany 
and female; 0 other-
wise. 
v434, v874 
EAST_2000 Dummy Interaction between EAST and the 2000 year-
dummy. 
1, if the respondent is 
born in East Germany 
and participates in the 
2000 survey; 0 oth-
erwise.  
v874,  v2 
RELIGION Dummy Religious denomination of the respondent. 1, if the respondent is 
a member of a reli-
gious community; 0 
otherwise. 
v435 
UNEMPLOY-
MENT RATE 
Continuous 
variable 
Unemployment rate of the respondent’s fed-
eral state (in %). Source: German Statistical 
Office. 
 v904 
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Endnotes 
 
1  Sensitivity defines the degree to which a certain person becomes aware of existing inequalities. Insensi-
tive persons only become aware of them if they are substantial in size. The more sensitive a person, the lower the 
threshold the inequality has to exceed in order to become recognized. Higher sensitivity does not necessarily go 
along with a higher inequality aversion but is a characteristic of the sensual system.   
2  From 1980 to 1986 an in 1991, the ALLBUS program was funded by the German Science Foundation 
(DFG). For all other surveys, state and federal funding has made available trough GESIS (Gesellschaft sozial-
wissenschaftlicher Infrastruktureinrichtungen). ALLBUS/GGSS is a joint project of the Center for Survey Re-
search and Methodology (ZUMA - Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen e.V., Mannheim) and the 
Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA- Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, Cologne) in 
cooperation with the ALLBUS scientific council. Data and documentation are obtainable through the Central 
Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA, Cologne). The institutions and persons mentioned above bear no 
responsibility for the use or interpretation of the data in this publication. 
3  For the full text in this and other questions, see the appendix. 
4  For this statement and hereafter, we use the translation proposed by the ALLBUS Codebook 1980-
2004.  
5 Since we are aware of a possible “reverse causality”; meaning those who think that the social differ-
ences are unfair might be more likely to be in favour of socialist ideas and not vice versa, the variable NEED 
remains our main indicator. 
6  “The scale assigns a value of 1 to the households head, of 0.5 to each additional adult member and of 
0.3 to each under-aged child.” (http://www.oecd.org/els/social) 
7 Year dummies are included in all set-ups and the likelihood ratio test justifies their introduction. 
